Managers often provide self-serving disclosures that blame poor corporate financial performance on temporary, external factors. For example, many managers have pointed to the September 11th terrorist attacks and the downturn in the economy as explanations for their firm's poor performance over the past year. Little is known about how financial analysts respond to such disclosures. Results of an experiment conducted with 94 financial analysts suggest that responses to self-serving management disclosures depend on the perceived plausibility of the disclosures. Specifically, we find that disclosures that blame poor performance on external factors tend to increase analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations when analysts believe that the disclosures are plausible, but not otherwise. When analysts find managers' self-serving disclosures to be implausible, they punish the firm with lower earnings forecasts and stock valuations than if the firm did not provide the disclosure. Thus, self-serving disclosures can backfire.
Introduction
Even the most casual review of earning announcements suggests that many firms provide disclosures that blame poor financial performance on external factors. Firms as varied as Ford Motor, Winn Dixie, WebMD, and Delta Airlines recently blamed poor financial results on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Likewise, numerous firms (e.g., Intel, McDonald's, and FedEx) attributed their recent financial woes to a downturn in the economy. The academic literature confirms these disclosure tendencies. Studies show that supplemental disclosures in annual reports (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983) and quarterly earnings forecasts (Baginski et al., 2000) tend to attribute poor performance to external factors. An open question, however, is how financial analysts respond to such disclosures.
In this paper, we develop and test a model of how analysts respond to external explanations for poor performance. Our basic proposition is that analysts' reactions to such disclosures depend on their perceptions of the disclosures' plausibility. Consider, for example, various companies' claims that the September 11 terrorist attacks were responsible for their poor 2001 financial results. When insurers, airlines, and tourism-related companies made this claim, most analysts accepted the explanation as plausible (Farrell 2001) . However, when Winn Dixie attributed their poor performance to these events, one prominent analyst said, "I have a hard time believing this could have had any kind of impact" (Farrell 2001) . Analysts expressed similar skepticism in response to Callaway Golf disclosures that blamed poor financial performance on the winds of el Nino, and Hershey Foods disclosures that blamed poor performance on economic problems in its relatively tiny (3%) Asian market (Perry et al., 2001) .
We propose that the plausibility of management's external explanations influence analysts' perceptions of earnings persistence. These beliefs about earnings persistence, in turn, influence analysts' earnings forecasts. Specifically, when analysts believe that an external explanation for poor performance is plausible, they are more likely to believe that the poor performance is temporary and to provide higher earnings forecasts. If analysts believe that an external explanation for poor performance is implausible, they might simply ignore management's implausible explanation and respond just as they would have had no explanation been provided. However, research in psychology gives reason to believe that analysts may make negative inferences about the firm's prospects when they receive implausible external explanations (McKenzie et al., 2002) . Specifically, analysts may infer that conditions at the firm must be especially bleak if management cannot provide a more credible explanation for poor performance. If this occurs, external explanations, which are often offered to convince analysts that the poor performance is temporary, may backfire and strengthen analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the poor performance. Such beliefs about earnings persistence will result in lower earnings forecasts than if no explanation had been provided.
We anticipate that these earnings forecast effects, in turn, will influence analysts' stock valuations. However, explanation plausibility may affect analysts' stock valuations through another variable as well. We propose that the plausibility of management's explanations will affect management's reporting reputation, and that these reputational effects will influence the discount rate that analysts use when valuing the firm. Thus, we expect explanation plausibility to have both 1) "numerator effects" (via analysts' earnings forecasts), and 2) "denominator effects" (via analysts' perceptions of management's reputation) on analysts' valuation judgments. Specifically, we predict that plausible external explanations will lead to higher earnings forecasts, increased management reputation, and thus higher stock valuations than if no explanation had been provided. In contrast, implausible external explanations will produce lower earnings forecasts, reduced management reputation, and thus lower stock valuations. We test our predictions by conducting an experiment with 94 financial analysts who are experienced at evaluating management's performance explanations. The analysts were randomly assigned to one of three conditions -a control condition, a plausible explanation condition, and an implausible explanation condition. All analysts received historical financial statement information about a firm that had experienced poor financial performance in the most recent year. In addition, analysts in the plausible and implausible conditions received management's explanation for the poor performance. These explanations blamed the firm's poor performance on an external event, but varied in plausibility. After viewing this information, the analysts provided assessments of the firm's future prospects and their perceptions of firm management.
Our results show that analysts are more likely to believe that poor performance is temporary when firms offer plausible external explanations for the poor performance.
Consequently, these analysts provide higher earnings forecasts and stock valuations than do analysts who are not provided with such explanations. Thus, blaming poor performance on external factors can be a beneficial strategy for companies when doing so is plausible. In contrast, implausible external explanations for poor performance strengthen analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the poor performance. That is, analysts do not simply ignore implausible explanations. Rather, they seem to infer that conditions at the firm must be especially bad if managers cannot provide a more persuasive explanation for the company's poor performance. As a result, these analysts provide lower earnings forecasts and stock valuations than do analysts who do not receive such explanations. Thus, blaming poor performance on external factors can backfire if analysts view the explanation as implausible.
Our results also show that the plausibility of management's performance explanations can affect management's reporting reputation. Specifically, we find that whereas plausible explanations do not increase management's reporting reputation, implausible explanations significantly decrease management's reporting reputation. This asymmetric result may occur because analysts expect managers to provide plausible disclosures. Thus, when analysts receive plausible explanations, they do not change their beliefs about management, but when they receive implausible explanations, they change their beliefs in a negative direction. These negative reputation changes are of consequence to managers. A reputation for credible disclosure affects a firm's cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1997; Healy et al., 1999) , and reputation, once damaged, is difficult to rebuild (Slovic, 1993) .
Our study makes several significant contributions to the literature. First, we provide additional evidence on how analysts respond to managers' explanations for their firm's financial performance. Prior studies suggest that analysts use management's explanations when evaluating a company (Barron et al., 1999; Clarkson et al., 1999) . However, we know little about the specific reactions analysts have to different types of management explanations. One reason for the dearth of studies on this important issue is that it is difficult to isolate analysts' reactions to particular management explanations. Management's explanations for financial results are almost always disclosed at the same time as the results themselves. Thus, reliance on archival data alone makes it difficult to separate the influence of financial performance data from the explanations of those data on analysts' beliefs. Our experimental method allows us to hold constant a firm's financial results and thereby isolate the effects of different types of management explanations.
An additional advantage of our experimental approach is that it allows us to unravel the process by which management explanations affect analysts' earnings forecasts and valuation judgments (Libby et al., 2001) . We offer and test a model of this process. Specifically, we maintain that explanation plausibility affects analysts' stock valuations via its effects on both (a) earnings forecasts, and (b) management's reporting reputation. To test this model, we elicit analysts' perceptions of these variables and conduct path analyses to examine whether one or both of these factors drives analysts' valuations. The data show that both earnings forecasts and management reputation are significant determinants of analysts' valuation judgments. Our results on the role of management reputation in analysts' valuation judgments may be especially instructive. The results of a number of archival studies are consistent with management's disclosure decisions influencing management reputation, and management reputation, in turn, affecting stock valuations (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Healy et al., 1999) . However, because it is difficult to measure management reputation using archival data, any reputation effects must be inferred, rather than measured. By using an experiment, we are able to measure management's reporting reputation and thereby offer a more direct test of the role of reputation in analysts' valuation judgments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and provides the theoretical basis for our predictions. Section 3 describes the experiment used to test these predictions. Section 4 reports the results of the experiment. The final section summarizes and discusses the practical and theoretical implications of our results.
Background & Theoretical development
M anagers are required to discuss and analyze their firm's financial results in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report. Managers often voluntarily provide explanations in other sources as well, such as earnings announcements, shareholders' letters, conference calls, and corporate presentations. There is evidence that financial analysts rely on these explanations. For example, analysts surveyed by Clarkson et al. (1999) indicate that MD&A disclosures contain useful, high-quality information that is not available from other sources.
1 Similarly, Rogers and Grant (1997) find that analysts' research reports rely more on explanations contained in MD&A than any other single source. Finally, Barron et al. (2001) show that MD&A disclosures influence stock prices, further corroborating the perceived usefulness of management performance explanations.
Prior research also has explored the types of explanations that management provides. Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Staw et al. (1983) examine management explanations provided in the shareholders' letter section of annual reports. They find that managers tend to provide "internal explanations" (i.e., explanations that point to persistent, internal factors such as great leadership or effective cost management initiatives) for good financial performance and "external explanations" (i.e., explanations that emphasize temporary, external factors such as supplier problems or natural disasters) for poor performance. Baginski et al. (2000) show that managers' explanations for their firm's expected future performance follow a similar pattern.
Earnings forecasts that entail good news are more likely to be ascribed to internal factors, whereas bad news earnings forecasts are more likely to be attributed to external factors.
Managers have incentives to provide such explanations because the explanations can have favorable effects on managers' job security and compensation if analysts believe them. Eighty-six percent of surveyed financial analysts indicate that management's discussion of firm performance is an "extremely" or "very" important factor to the analyst when assessing firm value (Fleishman-Hillard Research, 2000) . 2 If analysts believe that negative firm performance is due to external factors and positive performance is due to internal factors, they are more likely to infer that management is doing a good job managing the factors that are under its control. Such beliefs should have favorable effects on managers' job security. In addition, because Consequently, this disclosure pattern has been labeled "self-serving" by prior researchers (e.g., Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983) .
At first blush, these two sets of findings seem surprising. Given that managers' explanations for their firm's results are self-serving, why do financial analysts rely on these explanations when assessing the firm's future prospects? Prior research suggests that analysts may be skeptical of disclosures that are consistent with management's incentives (Eagly et al., 1978; Birnbaum and Stegner, 1979) , but this does not necessarily imply that these disclosures will be disregarded. Rather, analysts' skepticism about self-serving explanations may lead them to engage in additional cognitive processing to determine whether the disclosure should be relied upon (Hutton et al., 2002) . For example, suppose an apparel company reports a decrease in sales and attributes this decrease to unusually warm weather conditions over the past year. This explanation is certainly self-serving, as it blames the company's poor performance on an external factor. Consequently, analysts may use other cues (e.g., actual weather conditions over the past year or the percentage of profits typically derived from winter apparel) to assess the plausibility of management's explanation.
We propose that financial analysts' evaluate the plausibility of management's selfserving explanations, and that these evaluations play a critical role in determining how analysts react to those explanations. We test this prediction by examining how analysts react to external explanations for poor performance that vary in plausibility. We focus on external explanations for poor performance rather than internal explanations for good performance for several reasons.
internal factors are more likely to persist in future period than external factors (Bettman and Weitz, 1983) , attributing good performance to internal factors will increase beliefs that good performance will persist. Similarly, attributing poor performance to external factors will decrease beliefs that poor performance will persist. Thus, both types of attributions can potentially improve analysts' expectations about the firm's future performance and, in turn, have positive effects on the firm's stock price and managers' compensation (if managers are compensated based on stock price performance).
First, external explanations for poor performance are more prevalent (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983; Baginski et al., 2000) . Second, psychology studies show that people spend more time thinking about bad outcomes than good outcomes (Wong & Weiner, 1981) . This suggests that analysts will spend more time thinking about the reasons for poor performance, leading to relatively deeper analysis of management explanations and thus greater variability in perceived plausibility for external explanations for poor performance. In the remainder of this section, we develop specific hypotheses about the effects of plausible and implausible external explanations for poor performance on analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations.
External explanations for poor performance imply that the poor performance is temporary because external factors are unlikely to persist in future periods (Bettman and Weitz, 1983) .
Thus, when analysts receive plausible external explanations for poor performance, they will be more likely to believe that the poor performance is temporary than if no such explanation had been provided. These beliefs about earning persistence will be reflected in analysts' earnings forecasts, resulting in higher earnings forecasts for firms that provide plausible external explanations for poor performance.
When analysts receive implausible external explanations for poor performance, one possible response is for them to simply ignore the implausible explanation and rely solely on their own beliefs about the reasons for the firm's poor performance. If this occurs, implausible explanations will have no effect on analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the firm's poor performance, and thus no effect on analysts' earnings forecasts (Shanteau, 1975; Ostrom et al., 1978; Anderson, 1981 In sum, we predict that plausible external explanations for poor performance will decrease analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the firm's poor performance and thus increase analysts' earnings forecasts. With regard to implausible external explanations for poor performance, recent evidence suggests that analysts will use these explanations to draw negative inferences about the firm's prospects. These predictions are summarized graphically in Panel A
of Figure 1 and lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: A plausible external explanation for poor performance will result in higher earnings forecasts than if the explanation had not been provided.
Hypothesis 1b: An implausible external explanation for poor performance will result in lower earnings forecasts than if the explanation had not been provided.
[Insert Figure 1 ]
Analysts' earnings forecasts are important inputs to their stock valuation models (Frederickson and Miller, 2002) . Thus, we expect that if management's performance explanations affect analysts' earnings forecasts, these effects will be reflected in stock valuations as well. We also expect that management's performance explanations will affect management's reputation which, in turn, will affect analysts' stock valuations. Mercer (2002) shows that disclosures that are perceived as forthcoming have positive effects on management reputation, and disclosures that are perceived as not forthcoming have negative effects on management reputation. Assuming that analysts regard plausible explanations as forthcoming and implausible explanations as less than forthcoming, we predict that (a) plausible explanations will have positive effects on management's reporting reputation and (b) implausible explanations will have negative effects on management's reporting reputation. These effects on management reputation, in turn, will affect analysts' valuations (Dechow et al., 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Frederickson and Miller, 2002) .
To summarize, we predict that plausible external explanations for poor performance will result in lower perceived earnings persistence, higher earnings forecasts, and improvements in management's reputation relative to conditions in which no explanation is provided. Implausible external explanations for poor performance, in contrast, will result in higher perceived earnings persistence, lower earnings forecasts, and negative effects on management's reputation. These effects will lead to higher stock valuations when management provides plausible external explanations for poor performance and lower stock valuations when management provides implausible external explanations. This reasoning is summarized graphically in Panel B of Figure 1 and leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: A plausible external explanation for poor performance will result in higher stock valuations than if the explanation had not been provided.
Hypothesis 2b: An implausible external explanation for poor performance will result in lower stock valuations than if the explanation had not been provided.
Method
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment with 94 financial analysts. We recruited the analysts using a business school alumni database and randomly assigned analysts to one of three conditions (Plausible, Implausible, or Control). To be eligible for our study, participants were required to be experienced at evaluating management's performance explanations. The participants averaged 6.5 years of work experience in financial analysis, and the majority (66%) had obtained an MBA.
All participants were provided with information about Sutte, Inc., a hypothetical company that owns and operates restaurants in Turkey. Participants first received background information about the company, including a brief description of the company's business and a map with the locations of the company's restaurants (see Figure 2 ). In addition, participants …The unexpected negative results for 1999 are largely due to factors related to a major earthquake in Turkey in the middle of 1999. 3 The epicenter of the earthquake was near Kocaeli (in the far northwest region, near Istanbul) and tremors could be felt up to 150 miles away. No Sutte restaurants were damaged in the earthquake. However, Sutte restaurants near the epicenter were closed for several weeks following the earthquake. In addition, there was a decrease in consumer demand for fast food in areas near the epicenter (i.e., within 150 miles) for several months thereafter… This paragraph, in combination with the map in Figure 2 , provides a plausible explanation for Sutte's poor performance over the past year. The map shows that the vast majority of the company's stores are located in the northwest corner of the country where the major earthquake was centered.
Participants in the Implausible condition received an identical disclosure, except they were told that the earthquake was "near Van (in the far southeast region)" instead of "near Kocaeli (in the far northwest region, near Istanbul)." Because the map shows that most of Sutte's stores are in the northwest corner of the country -far from where the earthquake occurred in southeast Kocaeli -this earthquake is an implausible explanation for Sutte's poor performance. participants' performance expectations, we asked them to assess the persistence of the firm's recent poor performance and to provide earnings per share forecasts and stock valuation judgments. Participants also assessed management's financial reporting reputation. Finally, participants answered a series of manipulation check and demographic information questions. 4 There are many ways to manipulate explanation plausibility. For example, we could have provided participants with external explanations for poor financial performance and varied either the company's industry or the type of external event across conditions. However, these manipulations would have altered the information provided to participants in the experimental conditions as well as the plausibility of the explanations. Manipulating plausibility as we do allows us to vary plausibility but hold constant all other information about the company and its prospects.
Results & Discussion

Manipulation checks
Participants judged the plausibility of management's explanation on a 7-point Likert-type scale with endpoints labeled "Not at all plausible" and "Extremely plausible." Participants in the Plausible condition rated management's explanation as significantly more plausible (µ=4.9) than participants in the Implausible condition (µ=1.9) (t=10.23, p<0.01), suggesting that the plausibility manipulation was successful. Table 1 reports participants' earnings forecasts and stock valuations across the three conditions. One-way ANOVAs show significant effects of explanation plausibility on both the earnings per share (F=13.57, p<0.01) and stock valuation judgments (F=16.48, p<0.01).
Analysts' Earnings Forecasts & Stock Valuations
Consider first analysts' earnings per share judgments. Recall that we predict analysts will provide higher earnings forecasts when management provides a plausible external explanation for poor financial performance (Hypothesis 1a) and lower earnings forecasts when management provides an implausible external explanation for poor performance (Hypothesis 1b). Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, participants in the Plausible condition forecasted higher earnings (µ=$1.73) than participants in the Control condition (µ=$1.57) (t=2.15; p=0.02). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, participants in the Implausible condition forecast significantly lower earnings (µ=$1.34) than participants in the Control condition (µ=$1.57) (t=3.14, p<0.01).
[Insert Table 1] Participants' stock valuation judgments follow a similar pattern. We predicted that analysts would provide higher stock valuations when management provides a plausible external explanation for poor financial performance (Hypothesis 2a) and lower stock valuations when management provides an implausible external explanation for poor performance (Hypothesis 2b). Consistent with these hypotheses, stock valuations in the Plausible condition (µ=$16.87) are significantly higher than those in the Control condition (µ=$14.55) (t=2.47, p<0.01), while valuations in the Implausible condition (µ=$11.48) are lower than the Control (t=3.38, p<0.01).
These results suggest that management's explanations for their firm's past performance can have significant effects on analysts' expectations of the firm's future prospects. Specifically, we show that when analysts receive a plausible external explanation for poor performance, they provide higher earnings forecasts and stock valuations than if no such explanation were provided. However, management explanations may backfire when analysts do not find the explanations plausible. That is, analysts do not simply ignore implausible attempts to blame poor performance on external events. Rather, they make negative inferences that lead to lower earnings forecasts and stock valuations.
Understanding the Process
We also predicted the process by which self-serving explanations affect analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations. Specifically, we proposed that the plausibility of external explanations for poor performance would affect analysts' earnings forecasts via their effects on perceived earnings persistence. We also expected the plausibility of external explanation to affect analysts' stock valuations through their effects on (a) analysts' earnings forecasts and (b) management reputation. Understanding the relative influence of these factors on analysts' judgments is important because the factors have different longevity. Perceptions of earnings persistence may be altered when management announces the next period's earnings, but reputation effects, especially negative reputation effects, may be more long-lived (Slovic, 1993) .
A primary benefit of experimental research is the ability to collect process data that helps determine why effects occur (Libby et al., 2001) . In our experiment, we elicited analysts' perceptions of earnings persistence and management reputation, as well as their earnings forecasts and stock valuations. Therefore, we are able to analyze whether these factors do in fact drive analysts' judgments. In the remainder of this section, we examine the process by which external explanations' plausibility affects analysts' earnings forecasts and valuation judgments.
We expected that plausible external explanations for poor performance would strengthen analysts' beliefs that the poor performance was temporary. In contrast, we expected that implausible explanations might produce 'boomerang' effects, strengthening analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the poor performance. To test these predictions, we elicited analysts' beliefs about the persistence of the firm's recent poor performance on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where higher ratings indicated greater perceived persistence of the poor performance. The results, which appear in Table 2 , are consistent with our expectations. Analysts in the Plausible condition (µ=3.35) believed that the poor performance was significantly less likely to persist than did analysts in the Control condition (µ=3.97) (t=1.86, p=0.03). Implausible explanations had the opposite effect -analysts in the Implausible condition (µ=5.09) believed that the poor performance was more likely to persist than did analysts in the Control condition (t=3.52, p<0.01).
[Insert Table 2] The pattern in analysts' judgments of earnings persistence suggests that these judgments may be driving analysts' earnings forecasts. To test this suggestion, we conduct a path analysis.
Similar to the one-way ANOVA results reported in Table 1 , we include explanation plausibility as the independent variable and analysts' earnings per share forecasts as the dependent variable.
However, the path analysis also includes analysts' perceptions of earnings persistence as a mediating variable. If explanation plausibility affects earnings forecasts via its effects on earnings persistence, we expect significant effects for (1) explanation plausibility on perceived earnings persistence and (2) perceived earnings persistence on earning per share forecasts. In addition, after controlling for the effects of perceived earnings persistence, we expect that the direct link between explanation plausibility and earnings per share forecasts will become insignificant. Figure 3 reports the path analysis results. Consistent with our predictions, we find that explanation plausibility has a significant influence on analysts' judgments about the persistence of earnings (φ=-0.56, t=-3.28, p<0.01), and analysts' perceptions of earnings persistence, in turn, influence their earnings per share forecasts (φ=-0.11, t=-5.71, p<0.01). Importantly, we also find that when we control for earnings persistence, the link between explanation plausibility and analysts' earnings per share forecasts is insignificant (φ=0.05, t=1.36, p=0.17). Taken together, these results suggest that explanation plausibility affects analysts' earnings forecasts primarily via its effects on the perceived persistence of earnings.
[ Figure 3] We expect that any effects of explanation plausibility on analysts' earnings forecasts will flow through to their stock valuation judgments. We also propose that explanation plausibility will affect stock valuations via its effects on management's reporting reputation. Specifically, we predict that plausible and implausible explanations have, respectively, positive and negative effects on management's reporting reputation. To test this prediction, we asked analysts' to rate the truthfulness of management's disclosures on a 7-point Likert-type scale where higher ratings indicated a better reputation for truthful disclosure. Table 3 reports analysts' responses to this question. Contrary to our expectation, the perceived truthfulness of managers who provide plausible explanations (µ=3.88) is not significantly higher than the perceived truthfulness of managers who do not provide explanations (µ=3.73) (t=0.59, p=0.28). One explanation for this result is that analysts have an expectation that managers will provide plausible explanations for their firm's results. If this is true, then managers who meet this minimum threshold for disclosure will not be rewarded. However, analysts do punish managers who provide implausible explanations. Managers who provide implausible external explanations are rated as less truthful in their disclosures (µ=2.20) than managers who do not provide any explanation (µ=3.73) (t=6.38, p<0.01). These negative effects on reputation are somewhat ironic, given that one reason managers issue explanations blaming poor performance on external factors is to deflect blame away from themselves to help preserve their reputation. Our results suggest that this strategy will backfire if analysts believe that the explanation is not plausible.
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[Insert Table 3 ] We predicted that explanation plausibility would affect analysts' stock valuations via its effects on both management reputation and analysts' earnings forecasts. Previously, we showed that explanation plausibility indeed affects analysts' stock valuations (see Table 1 ). To further unravel the roles of management reputation and analysts' earnings forecasts in this process, we conduct a path analysis. As Figure 4 shows, our analysis includes explanation plausibility as the independent variable, analysts' valuation judgments as the dependent variable, and management 5 It is possible that implausible external explanations for poor performance hurt management's reputation for truthful disclosure but improve management's reputation on some other dimension, such as competence in running the business. However, we also asked analysts to assess their overall feelings about management (which should capture all dimensions of reputation) and find similar results. Analysts who were provided with implausible external explanations for poor performance reported more negative overall feelings about management (µ=2.42) than analysts who did not receive explanations (µ=3.76) (t=5.58, p<0.01).
reputation and analysts' earnings forecasts as mediating variables. If explanation plausibility affects analysts' stock valuations via its effects on both earnings forecasts and management reputation, we expect significant effects for explanation plausibility on both earnings per share forecasts and management reputation. Earnings per share forecasts and management reputation, in turn, are expected to have significant effects on stock valuation. In addition, after controlling for the effects of earnings per share forecasts and management reputation, we expect that the link between explanation plausibility and stock valuations will become insignificant.
[Insert Figure 4] As shown in Figure 4 , we find that explanation plausibility has significant effects on both earnings per share forecasts (φ=0.11, t=2.91, p<0.01) and management reputation (φ=0.60, t=5.71, p<0.01). These variables, in turn, are both important drivers of analysts' stock valuations; the links to stock valuations from earnings per share forecasts (φ=9.08, t=10.69, p<0.01) and management reputation (φ=0.60, t=1.92, p=0.06) are both significant. We also find that when we control for forecasted EPS and management reputation, the link between explanation plausibility and stock valuations is insignificant (φ=0.10, t=0.26, p=0.79). Thus, consistent with our theoretical predictions, explanation plausibility affects analysts' stock valuations via its effects on management reputation and analysts' earnings forecasts.
Conclusions
We find that managers' attempts to blame poor performance on external factors affect financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations. Specifically, when analysts believe such explanations, they are more optimistic about the firm's future prospects and thus provide higher earnings forecasts and stock valuations. However, when analysts do not believe managers' explanations, such disclosures cause analysts to make negative inferences about the firm's prospects, resulting in more pessimistic analyst earnings forecasts and stock valuations than if no explanation had been provided.
Additional analyses indicate that explanation plausibility affects analysts' earnings forecasts primarily via its effects on perceived earnings persistence. When management provides a plausible external explanation for poor performance, this strengthens analysts' beliefs that the poor performance is temporary, leading analysts to provide more optimistic earnings forecasts for the company. However, when management offers an implausible external explanation, analysts become more convinced that the poor performance will persist in future periods, leading to more pessimistic earnings forecasts than if no explanation had been provided.
Our data also indicate that these effects on analysts' earnings forecasts flow through to analysts' stock valuations. This results in higher stock valuations in response to plausible external explanations for poor performance and lower stock valuations in response to implausible external explanations. Finally, we show that external explanations sometimes affect management's reputation, and that management reputation is an additional driver of analysts' stock valuations.
Unfortunately for managers who seek to improve their reputations by providing credible explanations for their performance failures, the reputational effects of external explanations are not symmetric. That is, when analysts find management explanations implausible, management's reporting reputation is damaged in the eyes of the analyst, but when management explanations are plausible, analysts do not reward management with an improved reputation.
Our results have both practical and theoretical implications. On a practical level, our results provide guidance to managers about how financial analysts will react to their performance explanations. Blaming poor performance on external factors can be a risky strategy. If analysts deem such explanations implausible, they do not simply ignore the explanations. Rather, they make negative inferences about the firm's prospects. Thus, our results underscore the importance of gauging the plausibility of external explanations for poor performance before providing such explanations. In addition, because we provide data not just on the effects of implausible explanations, but also on why such effects occur, our results should be helpful to managers who inadvertently provide implausible explanations. We find that implausible explanations have negative effects on analysts' beliefs about both the persistence of the poor performance and management's reputation for truthful disclosure. Thus, our results imply that any subsequent efforts at damage control should focus in these areas.
Our results have theoretical implications as well. Prior studies show that managers tend to blame poor performance on external factors (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983; Baginski et al., 2000) . We extend this literature by examining how financial analysts respond to such explanations. Psychology studies suggest that because these explanations are "selfserving," they will be discounted (Eagly et al. 1978; Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) . Although some discounting may occur, we find that plausible external explanations influence analysts' judgments in the intended manner. However, we also show that when analysts find external explanations for poor performance to be implausible, these supposedly "self-serving" explanations can backfire and have negative consequences. Finally, our results suggest several areas for further inquiry. Given the importance of explanation plausibility on analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations, future studies may wish to examine the factors that analysts use to assess an explanation's plausibility. In our study, analysts assessed the plausibility of management's explanations by thinking about whether an earthquake in a particular location could explain a firm's poor financial performance. In other cases, the process by which analysts assess an explanation's plausibility may be more complex (e.g., multiple cues, dependencies, combination rules). Future empirical research examining the cues that analysts use to evaluate management's explanations and how these cues are combined to come up with an overall determination of an explanation's plausibility will further our understanding of analysts' reactions to management disclosures.
In addition, researchers may wish to consider the influence of the type of external explanation on analysts' judgments. Our study examines analysts' judgments in a setting where management blames poor performance on an earthquake. External attributions to similar onetime events (e.g., fire, flood, scandal, terrorist incident) are not uncommon. However, some external explanations, such as unfavorable weather patterns or economic conditions, refer to events that may persist or recur in future quarters. Future research that explores how analysts react to different types of external explanations will deepen our understanding of analysts' information processing. 
_________________________
After reviewing the experimental stimuli, participants rated management's reputation for truthful disclosure on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where higher ratings indicate greater perceived truthfulness.
